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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Jason Amboh's petition for postconviction relief. Clerk's Record (R) 76-79.

B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts
On March 11, 2009, Mr. Amboh filed a p r o se petition for post-conviction relief. In the
petition, Mr. Amboh stated that he pled guilty to DUI and was sentenced on June 21,2007. R 1.
Mr. Amboh alleged three grounds for relief in his petition: 1) that trial counsel did not file
a timely appeal; 2) that trial counsel and the state appellate defender did not infonn him when his
appeal was "denied"; and 3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the criminal
case and/or on appeal. R 2.
Mr. ~ m b o happended a letter to his petition from his

defender, Robert Eldredge.

The letter, dated August 14,2007, states that Mr. Eldredge had received Mr. Amboh's letter
dated August 12, 2007, which requested that a notice of appeal he filed. However, Mr. Eldredge
stated that the letter had al~ivedtoo late for a timely notice of appeal. Nonetheless, Mr. Eldredge
stated, "I have filed the Appeal anyway." (Emphasis original.) Mr. Eldredge's letter further
stated that he did not believe that an appeal would be helpful and that Mr. Amboh could pursue
post-conviction relief citing Criminal Rule 57. R 8.
Mr. Amboh's petition also included an affidavit from Molly Buskey of the State
Appellate Defender. Ms. Huskey stated that her office was appointed to represent Mr. Amboh on
direct appeal on August 15, 2007. R 9. However, he was not assigned an individual attorney at
that time, because the transcripts and record were not yet available. R 10. And, before Mr.

Amboh could be assigned an individual attorney, his appeal was dismissed as untimely. R. 1112. Because Mr. Amboh did not have an individual attorney assigned, no letter was sent to him
notifying him of the dismissal of his appeal. R 12. Fuither, he did not contact SAPD until
February 2,2009, and at that time, a review of the status of the case was made. R 12
Counsel was appointed to represent Mr. Amboh on his petition. R 44.
The state moved for summary dismissal. R 50. Following oral argument, the District
Court summarily dismissed the petition on two grounds: 1) it was untimely; and 2) there was no
genuine issue of fact in dispute. Tr. p. 10, In. 5 - p. 11, In. 17. In dismissing the petition, the
Court stated:
It's a jurisdictional issue. If we had the standard that defendant didn't know, they
would all claim they didn't know and there wouldn't be any time limit at all to file
post conviction because they would all claim they didn't know the proverbial
'disposition' of the case.
Tr. p. 10, in. 18-24
This appeal timely followed. R 67.

111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Should the statute of limitation be tolled given that Mr. Amboh's petition raises

important due process claims and he did not discover the facts underlying his claims until after
the time period had run?
2. Did Mr. Amboh's petition alleging trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to file a
timely notice of appeal raise a genuine issue of mateiial fact?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Statute of Limitation Should Have Been Tolled Until Mr. Amboh
Discovered the Facts Underlying his Claim.
The District Courl erred in not finding that the statute of limitation was tolled due to the
admitted failure of defense coiinsel, both trial counsel and appellate counsel, to notify Mr
Amboh of the dismissal of his appeal.
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that petitions for post-conviction relief be filed "within
one year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or
from the determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." And, the failure
to file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal, unless the petitioner has shown a reason why the
statute of limitation should be tolled. Person v. State, 147 Idaho 453,454, 210 P.3d 561, 562
(Ct. App. 2009), citing Eveizsioky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 967, 969 (2001) and
Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003). The question of whether
the District Coilit erred in not tolling the post-conviction statute of limitation is subject to free
review. Persoiz, supra
The time limitation for filing a post-conviction petition should be enlarged when the
petitioner has been effectively denied access to the courts. Sayas v. State, supra, citing Anderson
v. State, 133 1daho'788,792,992P.2d 783,787 (Ct. App. 1999). While the bar for equitable
tolling is high, tolling is appropriate in at least three situations: 1) where the petitioner was
incarcerated in an out-of-state facjlity on an in-state conviction without legal representation or
access to Idaho legal materials; 2) where mental disease andlor psychotropic medication rendered
a petitioner incompetent and prevented the petitioner from earlier pursing a challenge to his

conviction; and 3) where the post-conviction claim raises important due process issues, the
limitation period may be postponed until the petitioner has discovered the factual basis for the
claim. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25, 218 P.3d 1 , 4 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied, citing
Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530,536,944 P.2d 127, 133 (Ct. App. 1994); Sayas v. State, supra;
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381,385,924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996); Charboneau v. State,
144 Idaho 900,904-05, 174 P.3d 870, 874-75 (2008).
Mr. Amboh's case involves this third ground for tolling. Mr. Amboh's petition raises an
important due process claim; specifically, the claim that counsel did not file a timely appeal. See,
Judd v. State, supra, citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000); Goodwin
v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272-73, 61 P.3d 626,629-30 (Ct. App. 2002); LaBelle v. State, 130

Idaho 115, 119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct.App. 1997); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,900 P.2d 221
(Ct. App. 313,900 P.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1995); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 591-93, 861 P.2d
1253, 1256-58 (Ct. App. 1993). Likewise, Mr. Amhoh's claims that trial counsel was
ineffective raise a significant due process claim as the state and federal constitutions require
effective assistance of counsel in criminal trials. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho at 316,900 P.2d at 224. As set out in Rhoades v. State, Idaho

,

P.3d -2009 WL 3415732 " 5 ". . . the serious due process concerns enunciated

in Charboneau encompass cases involving access to the courts claims. It would similarly cover
claims of incompetency." (Citations omitted.)
Further, Mr. Amboh did not discover the facts underlying his claim of failure to file a
timely appeal until after the limitation period had run. Mr. Amboh was specifically told by trial
counsel that a direct appeal had been filed. And, neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel told

him when his direct appeal was dismissed. Rather, he did not find out that his appeal had been
dismissed until February 2,2009. And, he filed his petition for post-conviction relief less than
six weeks later, on March 1I , 2009.
Under these circumstances, the Dist~ictCourt erred in summarily dismissing Mr.
Amboh's petition on the grounds that it was untimely. Mr. Amboh's petition raised an important
due pl-ocess claim and he did not discover the facts underlying his claim, that counsel's late filing
of a notice of appeal was not effective and that his appeal was dismissed, until after the statute of
limitation had run. Under these circumstances, the statute of limitation should have been tolled.
Judd, supra.

The District Court dismissed Mr. Amboh's petition not only because it believed it was
untimely, but also because it believed that the petition did not raise a genuine issue of material
fact. However, it is clear that the issue Mr. Amboh pled, whether counsel was ineffective when
he failed to file a timely notice of appeal, raises a genuine issue of material fact and the District
Court's decision to the contrary should be reversed
Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rhoades v. State, supra at 3

. . . On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. However, 'while the underlying facts must be regarded as true,
the petitioner's conclusions need not be so accepted.'
Id., at 3-4 (citations omitted). See also, Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838-9, 172 P.3d

1109, 1113-4 (2007) (standard of liberal construction is applied in order to avoid dismissal of an
inartfully drawn complaint that gives adequate notice of the claims sought to be asserted).
In this case, Mr. Amboh raised a claim that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to
file a timely notice of appeal. And, indeed, the record bears this out. Mr. Amboh's direct appeal
was dismissed because the notice of appeal was untimely. This claim does raise a genuine issue
of material fact.
Per Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477, 120 S.Ct. at 1035, an attorney who disregards
specific instructions from a client to file a notice of appeal has I-enderedconstitutionally
unreasonable assistance. Likewise, an attorney who follows the explicit instructions of a client
not to file a notice of appeal has not rendered unreasonable assistance. Stricklaizd v. Washington,
466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2052. See also, Goodwirz v. State, 138 Idaho at 272,61 P.3d at 629.
In cases in the middle, where the client has neither instructed counsel to file or not to file
a notice of appeal, a separate, but antecedent, question must be addressed: whether counsel in
fact consulted with the client about an appeal. If counsel did consult with the client, counsel's
performance is deficient only if helshe failed to follow the client's express instructions. And, if
counsel has not consulted with the client, then a second subsidiary question must be addressed:
whether counsel's failure to consult amounts to deficient performance. Counsel has a
constitutionally imposed duty to consultwith the client about an appeal when there is reason to
think either (1) that a rational client would want to appeal (for example, when there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular client has reasonably demonstrated to
counsel that helshe was interested in appealing. In making this determination, the court must
take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known. Flores-Ortega, 528

U.S. at 479, 120 S.Ct. at 1036. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 273,61 P.3d at 630, "If counsel has not
consulted with the defendant, then counsel's perfoi~nancein failing to consult with the defendant
is itself deficient if a rational defendant would want to appeal or the particular defendant
reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he or she was interested in appealing."
To show prejudice if counsel has rendered deficient performance in not consulting with
the client, it must be shown that if not for the failure to consult, the client would have timely
appealed. Flares-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1038. Goodwin, supra.
In this case, Mr. Ainboh alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in not filing a timely
notice of appeal. And, the state admitted that a timely notice was not filed. This raised a genuine
issue of material fact. If the failure to file the notice of appeal occurred despite Mr. Amboh's
request to file an appeal, then the failui-e was deficient performance and there is a presumption of
prejt~diceI-equiringpost-conviction relief. Flores-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. at 483, 120 S.Ct. at 1038.
And, if the failure accursed in the absence of either direction from Mr. Amboh or consultation
regarding appellate rights from counsel, then the secondary question must be addressed: whether
counsel had a constitutional duty to consult with Mr. Amboh. The answer to that question
depends upon whether ( I ) a rational client would have wanted to appeal or (2) Mr. Amboh
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. And, if it is determined that counsel
had a duty to consult with Mr. Amboh and failed in that duty, the question of prejudice must be
addressed: whether there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failure, Mr. Amboh
would have timely appealed. Flores-Ortegcl, 528 U.S. at 469-84, 120 S. Ct. at 1035-38.
While Mr. Amboh's petition might have been better drafted by an attorney, it clearly
raised the question of whether.counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file a timely

notice of appeal. This was a genuine issue of material fact and consequently, summary dismissa1

was inappropriate. ffauschuld v. State, supra.

V. CONCLUSION
Because the District Court erred in both its conclusions - that the statute of limitation
shauld not be tolled and that the petition did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel - the order summarily dismissing Mr. Amboh's
petition should now be reversed and the matter remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
64
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